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What would be the counterfactual wage of civil servants if they were employed in the 
private  sector?  Using  the  French  European  Household  panel,  we  present  a  new 
approach  to  the  wage  differential  between  the  public  and  the  private  sectors.  We 
estimate  a  model,  which  controls  both  for  selection  into  employment,  and  for  self-
selection into the public sector. We also introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the 
propensity to be employed in either job sector, and in the sector-specific productivity. 
Evidence  based  on  the  counterfactual  distributions  suggests  a  large  public-private 
wage premium for low public wages. This conclusion also holds for women but may be 
explained by a weaker discrimination in the public sector. Unlike women, most male 
civil servants would earn more in the private sector. 






Les écarts de salaire public-privé : un capital humain 
spécifique à la fonction publique ? 
 
Résumé 
Quel serait le salaire des fonctionnaires s’ils travaillaient dans le secteur privé ? À 
l’aide du Panel Européen des Ménages, nous présentons une nouvelle approche au 
différentiel de salaires entre secteur public et secteur privé. Nous estimons un modèle 
où nous contrôlons de la double sélection : participation et choix de secteur, et de 
l’hétérogénéité inobservée dans la propension à être en emploi, dans l’un ou l’autre 
des secteurs, et dans la productivité spécifique à chaque secteur. Les distributions 
contrefactuelles estimées permettent de conclure à une prime à l’emploi public pour 
les bas salaires. La même conclusion tient pour les femmes, mais pour ces dernières, 
cet  « avantage »  est  dû  à  une  moindre  discrimination.  À  l’inverse,  la  plupart  des 
hommes en emploi dans le secteur public bénéficieraient de salaires plus élevés dans 
le secteur privé. 
Mots-clés  :  distributions  contrefactuelles,  différentiel  de  salaire,  secteurs  public  et 
privé, hétérogénéité inobservée 
 
Classification JEL : J31, J45, J64, C21, C33, C35 1. Introduction
There has been an increasing interest in studying public sector employment for more than two decades.
This process was initiated by Smith (1977) and this is justiﬁed by the large share of public employment
in total employment. Over that period of time, this proportion does not decrease for any western country
but for UK. For instance, in France, in 2006, this share amounts to one quarter of total employment, and
it has been relatively stable since the beginning of the nineties. Providing a study that properly takes
into account the factors that can explain differences between public and private wages is therefore an
important policy issue.
In this paper, we evaluate the counterfactual wage people currently employed in the public sector,
would have in the private sector. Wealso determine whether public workers beneﬁt from a wage premium
along the public wage distribution. To do so, we model private sector and public sector wages, in a panel
framework, controlling for the double selection in employment and in sector choices, and we account for
unobserved heterogeneity through the use of ﬁnite mixture distributions. We derive from this model the
unobserved productivity public workers would have in the private sector, and reciprocally.
Hence this paper contributes to the scarce literature dealing with the French case regarding the clas-
sical analysis of the public wage gap. Fournier (2001) studies raw public wage premiums.Fougère and
Pouget (2003) concentrate on the main determinants of the entry into the public sector. Bargain and
Melly (2008) focus on the public sector pay gap using quantile regressions on a short panel data set and
compare the quantiles of both distributions. Unlike Bargain and Melly (2008), we observe each individ-
ual for 8 years, which ensures convergence properties that can not be ensured when people are surveyed
only three times.
This paper also expands some previous approaches: many recent studies rely on cross sectional
switching regressions, endogenous or not (see Disney and Gosling (1998) and Gyourko and Tracy (1988)
for UK, Dustman and Van Soest (1998) for Germany, Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) and Van Ophem
(1993) for the Netherlands, Fougère and Pouget (2003) for France and Heitmueller (2006) for Scot-
land). In a different way, Heitmueller (2006) controls for participation and sector selections, but in
cross-sectional analysis. In order to overcome these potential biases, Disney and Gosling (2003) uses the
natural experiment that happened in the UK in the nineties with the privatization programme. They show
that their results are robust to self-selection.
A second set of papers raise close but different issues about wages and mobility between both
sectors. Bell, Elliott, and Scott (2005) exploit mobility between both sectors, and study the wage
incentives to change sector. They identify the wage premium after a job change. Other studies focus
on the link between the wage distribution and mobility. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) and Cappellari
(2002) focus on earnings dynamics and lifetime values of employment in both sectors. They argue that
public and private sectors differ not only in their log wage distribution but also in their income mobility.
They conclude, for UK and resp. for Italy, that adopting a life cycle view of earnings matters in the
private sector whereas it does not in the public sector.1
Our paper is more in line with Dustman and Van Soest (1998) and Heitmueller (2006). We extend
their approach by considering a panel framework, controlling for both self selection into employment and
into the public sector. Unobserved heterogeneity, modeled by using the method of Heckman and Singer
(1984) allows us to control for individual tastes and propensity to be employed in a given sector, and
for individual abilities. An individual has a different propensity to earn low or high wages in different
sectors.
1Another trend of the literature on public/private differences concerns queue models (Venti (1987), Heywood and Mohanty
(1995) and Fougère and Pouget (2003)) and analyzes the individual propensity to seek employment in public sectors. But these
models require very detailed information about the supply and demand for public jobs. Furthermore, they are very sensitive to
the instruments chosen and it turns out difﬁcult to separately identify the characteristics determining the search for a public job
from those determining the access to a public job. Bellante and Link (1981) argue there are more risk adverse workers in the
public sector, and Goddeeris (1988) point out a taste for public services.
3We estimate this model with data from the French European Household panel (ECHP) over the period
1994-2001. We obtain a very good model ﬁt in terms of income distribution, employment probability
and sector choice. Our results concur with the existing literature, but thanks to the new approach we
adopt, we can assess the counterfactual wage civil-servants would get if employed in the private sector.
Female are the ones who beneﬁt from a public wage premium since gender discrimination is larger in the
private sector. Unlike women, most male civil-servants suffer a public wage penalty. Apart from those
at the bottom of the wage distribution, they would get higher wages in the private sector. We also ﬁnd
that mimicking one’s father is determinant in the public sector choice whereas the mother status turns out
to be non signiﬁcant. Finally, as it has been already shown in previous papers, the public sector attracts
more people when the local labor market is depressed.
We carry out a descriptive analysis of our data in section 2, and the statistical model to be estimated
is detailed in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 discuss results and simulations. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. The data
2.1. A brief description
We use data from the waves 1994 to 2001 of the French European Household Survey. We restrict our
sample to individuals aged from 16 to 59 years old at the beginning of the panel. We do include female in
the sample given their high participation rate in France, and given the fact that we control for participa-
tion. We deﬁne three sectors of activity or labor force status: nonemployment, employment in the private
sector, and employment in the public sector. We consider that individuals work in the public sector when
they answer they work for state or local governments. Otherwise, they are said to work in the private
sector, namely they are employed by national or private ﬁrms, or by their own ﬁrm.2 Self-employed
workers and unpaid workers in a family business are excluded. We also exclude individuals who work,
but who do not declare any wage. This leaves us with 5;092 individuals, we follow over 8 years.
Concerning educational level, we consider the highest education degree instead of the number of
years of studying. In France, civil-servant exams are indeed conditional on degrees.
The French European Household survey provides annual wage earnings and a monthly description
of the occupation, but it does not provide the speciﬁc wage of the job occupied during the month of the
interview. We thus divide the annual wage earnings by the total number of months employed during the
year. In order to get an accurate estimate for this monthly wage, cautiousness is required when people
have two jobs or more in a given year, but this is actually the case for less than 5% of the employed
people in a given year. Hence, for these people, we divide the annual wage earnings by the number of
months they are employed whatever the number of jobs they got throughout the year. Finally, monthly
wages are assessed in French francs at 1994 prices.
2.2. Some descriptive statistics
The initial sample (without age restriction) contains half nonemployed and half employed people. Log-
ically in the sample restricted to people aged from 16 to 59, employed people are over-represented (see
table 1). In the data, the public sector represents one third of employed people.3
The proportion of women is traditionally higher in the public than in the private sector, since it is
easier to conciliate professional and family lives while employed in the public sector (see table 2). Few
foreigners work in the public sector because entrance exams often require French citizenship. Entrance
exams also require a minimum degree level, hence the distribution of degrees differs between sectors.
2There is no cross-validation of their employment status as in Card (1996) and the different public services cannot be
distinguished.
3In national statistics, the public sector amounts to one fourth of total employment including the self-employed. In this
paper we have excluded the self-employed, which explains the higher proportion of public employment we get. This proportion
is roughly the same when assessed on the non-balanced panel data.
4Public jobs require usually more qualiﬁcation, undergraduates and graduates are thus more represented
in the public sector. Unlike skilled workers, the unskilled ones are more present in the private sector.
Concerning age, the management of older workers’ career differs between sectors and private workers
are younger on average than their public sector counterparts.
Finally consider some ﬁgures about transitions. The following matrix gives details about transition
probabilities between different states over 1994-2001. Very few individuals move from the private to
the public sector, while opposite movements are more frequent but still rare. 7% of private workers and
4.7% of public workers become nonemployed in the subsequent period. They may have lost their job
or decided to stop working for a while (for instance, women may decide to get out of the labor force to
bring up their children).
Nonemployment Private Public
Nonemployment 87.56 9.83 2.62
Private 6.95 92.65 0.40
Public 4.69 1.26 94.05
Rows refer to the sector at date t ¡ 1, and columns to the sector at date t.
Table 1 Nonemployment, employment in public and private sectors.
Activity status 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Non Employed 1,692 1,653 1,663 1,671 1,655 1,637 1,692 1,740
(33%) (32%) (33%) (33%) (32%) (32%) (33%) (34%)
Employed 3,400 3,439 3,429 3,421 3,437 3,455 3,400 3,352
(67%) (68%) (67%) (67%) (68%) (68%) (67%) (66%)
Sector
Public 1,061 1,084 1,086 1,057 1,052 1,042 1,014 993
(31%) (32%) (32%) (31%) (31%) (30%) (30%) (30%)
Private 2,339 2,355 2,343 2,364 2,385 2,413 2,386 2,359
(69%) (68%) (68%) (69%) (69%) (70%) (70%) (70%)
Source: French European Household Survey.
2.3. Simple regressions
Table 3 presents the results we get with simple regressions. We ﬁrst regress the log of the monthly wage
on a public sector dummy and a few covariates. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows that the raw public-
private gap over 1994-2001 is 22.3 log points (around 25%). Conditioning on more covariates, such as
age, a proxy of experience -the age at the end of studies, and degrees (second speciﬁcation), this public-
private pay gap is still signiﬁcant and amounts to 8.5%. In speciﬁcation 3, we process 2SLS to take into
account that sector selection is endogenous.4 In this speciﬁcation 3, the public wage premium estimate
is 24%. In a ﬁnal speciﬁcation, we process separate regressions allowing different returns to experience,
to degrees in both sectors. And if we evaluate the raw premium as the constant coefﬁcient, it turns out to
be 39%, but this measure does not take into account the different returns to covariates between the public
and the private sector. Hence it is not certainly the good way to proceed.
4In the sector choice equation, we include a proxy of the father status, as well as a proxy of the mother status, at the end
of the individual’s studies. Were the father or the mother civil-servants? The instruments we consider are the gender times the
status of one’s mother, and the gender times the status of one’s father. Finally we also include the unemployment rate to explain
the sector choice.
5Table 2 General descriptive statistics - 1994
Whole Sample Private Sector Public Sector
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Gender
Women 2,750 54.01 955 40.83 628 59.19
Men 2,342 45.99 1,384 59.17 433 40.81
Nationality
French 4,887 95.97 2,220 94.91 1,053 99.25
Not French 205 4.03 119 5.09 8 0.75
Region
Paris 698 13.71 351 15.01 170 16.02
Out of Paris 4,394 86.29 1,988 84.99 891 83.98
Age
16-29 1,442 28.32 555 23.73 170 16.02
30-39 1,395 27.40 742 31.72 340 32.05
40-49 1,378 27.06 741 31.68 372 35.06
50-59 877 17.22 301 12.87 179 16.87
Highest diploma
No secondary degree 1,838 36.10 742 31.72 276 26.01
Vocational technical school (Basic) 1,449 28.46 851 36.38 242 22.81
High school degree 745 14.63 308 13.17 143 13.48
(general or vocational)
Technical College, undergraduate 765 15.02 299 12.78 270 25.45
university,
or Licence, Maitrise
Graduates 295 5.79 139 5.94 130 12.25
Part-time 553 16.3 360 15.4 181 17.1
The statistics given above are assessed on the ﬁrst year 1994.
Source: French European Household Survey.
The differences in the estimation of the public wage gap prompt us to carefully examine our speciﬁ-
cation, and the way we estimate this premium.
From descriptive statistics the log monthly wage variance is lower in the public sector than in the
private one whatever the degree, except for high school dropouts. Internal exams may promote signiﬁ-
cantly upward mobility for lower degrees, increasing the wage variance of this group. For other degrees,
this is consistent with wage compression in the public sector. The log monthly wage mean is also higher
in the public sector when degree is not controlled for (see ﬁgure 1). Conditional on degree, this still
holds except for graduates who seem to be less rewarded in the public than in the private sector. Hence
the public sector seems to protect lower degrees from unemployment and lower wages. As descriptive
statistics do not control for selectivity, we need to go one step further. The model we propose control
for participation selection, and for sector choice, as well as unobserved and observed heterogeneity: age,
potential experience,5 region, number of children less than 3 years old, between 3 and 6...
5Experience cannot be precisely measured in the data. Hence we use the age at the end of studies as a proxy of potential
experience. It is a proxy for general experience and not for sector-speciﬁc experience. We do not introduce potential experience
itself in the wage equation to avoid colinearity between potential experience and age.
6Table 3 Simple regressions on the log of monthly wage
Speciﬁcation
1 2 3 4
Private Sector Public Sector
Constant 7.165 5.304 5.354 5.262 5.593
-0.010 0.048 0.050 0.058 0.086
Public 0.223 0.082 0.212
0.007 0.006 0.045
Gender -0.418 -0.241 -0.260 -0.262 -0.184
0.007 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.009
Paris region 0.193 0.196 0.238 0.096
0.009 0.009 0.011 0.015
Age (years=10) 0.661 0.639 0.698 0.581
0.020 0.022 0.025 0.036
Age squared (years2=10) -0.063 -0.062 -0.069 -0.052
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
Age of end of study (years=10) 0.089 0.125 0.094 0.002
0.019 0.007 0.026 0.028
Age of end of study squared (years2=10) -0.018 0.364 -0.015 -0.013
0.003 0.009 0.005 0.004
Vocational degree 0.125 0.464 0.129 0.102
0.007 0.012 0.008 0.012
High School degree 0.370 0.728 0.355 0.398
0.009 0.015 0.010 0.015
College and undergraduate 0.486 0.081 0.465 0.506
0.008 0.019 0.011 0.013
Graduate 0.756 -0.017 0.796 0.714
0.011 0.003 0.015 0.016
Part-time -0.613 -0.613 -0.640 -0.554
0.007 0.007 0.009 0.011
Source: French European Household Survey.
We control for time dummies in the wage equation.
Speciﬁcations 1 and 2: OLS regressions. Speciﬁcation 3: 2SLS regression to control for sector choice endogeneity.
Speciﬁcation 4: OLS regressions for each sector.
3. Econometric model and estimation principles
3.1. Model
As unobserved heterogeneity is crucial to understand different economic behaviors and unobserved pro-
ductivity, we add unobserved terms to each equation. Following the method of Heckman and Singer
(1984), we model unobserved heterogeneity µ via a discrete random variable whose distribution has a
given number of support points to be estimated. We assume that there are K types of individuals, ¼k
denotes the probability of type k. Within this framework, unobserved heterogeneity is type speciﬁc such
as sector speciﬁc. An individual may for instance have a sector speciﬁc ability and his unobserved abil-
ity may be rewarded differently according to the sector. Hence an individual of type k has a different
propensity to earn low or high wages in both sectors, this propensity is captured by µPu
k and µPr
k . The
propensity to work rather in the public than in the private sector is captured by µZ
k , it may represent a
particular taste for public services.
7In a ﬁrst equation, we consider the employment status. It describes the fact that the individual works
or does not (yit = 1 if the individual works, yit = 0 otherwise). In a second equation, as the structural
model described above conﬁrms it, we consider the sector choice as a binary variable (zit = 1 when the
individual works in the private sector, zit = 0 when he works in the public sector): the nonemployed
search for both public and private jobs when cPu · Upu. And this threshold depends on explanatory
variables such as individual covariates and the local unemployment rate. We also include in the explana-
tory variables the difference of the expected log wages between the public and the private sectors. This
difference depends on the type of the individual. Finally we have a switching wage equation: the third
(resp. fourth) equation is the log monthly wage in the private sectorwPr
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denotes the vector of the unobserved heterogeneity components,












denotes the vector of residuals, which are assumed to be independent and




The model identiﬁcation does not only rely on functional assumptions (imposed on the residual distribu-
tions), but also on exclusion restrictions. On the one hand, in the nonemployment/employment equation,
we include the number of children between 0 and 3, the number of children between 3 and 6, and the
spouse income. These variables are crucial for explaining female participation (see Hyslop (1999) and
Edon and Kamionka (2008)). And they are excluded from the sector choice and the wage equations.
Female may indeed have a higher propensity to choose the public sector when they intend to have chil-
dren, but their precise number of children may rather inﬂuence their participation decision and it does
not inﬂuence the sector choice.
On the other hand, in the sector choice equation, a proxy of the father status, as well as a proxy of
the mother status at the end of the individual’s studies, are included. These are known to be determinants
of the civil servant status (Audier (2000)). As the true status of the parents’ occupation is not directly
6The model does not include lagged dependent variables. It could be included to capture state dependence. In such a case,
the introduction of initial conditions could be solved using the method proposed by Wooldridge (2005) or the one proposed by
Heckman (1981). This would entail to compute the likelihood recursively, conditional on the initial conditions.
7The assumption of independence across residuals is not restrictive since we follow Heckman and Singer (1984) to model
the unobserved heterogeneity, see also Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Arcidiacono (2005).
8observed, a proxy is built from the two-digit classiﬁcation of their occupation. Hence we consider the
father (resp. mother) was a civil servant when he (resp. she) was either ’senior civil servants, information
professionals or creative and performing artists’ or ’middle-level health and teaching workers, middle-
level civil servants’ or ﬁnally ’middle-level civil servants’. These variables are excluded from the rest of
the model.8
Finally, in order to ensure identiﬁcation of the unobserved heterogeneity, the intercept is excluded
from each equation.
3.3. Likelihood and estimation principles









denote the unconditional probability that an individual has the type k. As we consider a discrete distribu-
tion for the heterogeneity terms, we rely on the Expectation-Maximization9 (EM) algorithm (Dempster,
Laird, and Rubin (1977)) to estimate the model.10
This algorithm iterates the two following steps until the stability of the log-likelihood (for detailed































where Ti is the random variable representing the type of the individual i. ¼
(n)
ik denotes the posterior
probability for the individual i to be of type k.
M-step








































8In 1994, among women who work, 13% of them have a father who was civil-servant, and 10:6% a mother who was
civil-servant. For men, these percentage are respectively 12:3% and 8:4%.
9We do not use Simulated Maximum Likelihood to estimate the model, since it is time consuming and it presents convergence
failures. Even with precise and accurate initial conditions, the program fails to converge quickly and it seems to get trapped in
some regions.
10Standard errors are obtained by parametric bootstrap.
9Second, due to the partial separability of the conditional completed log-likelihood function (Ar-
cidiacono and Jones (2003)), we get four sequential optimization problems since residuals are
assumed to be independent across the four equations (see Appendix D).
Thus, we ﬁrst maximize the participation equation, then the log-earnings equations. Given the esti-
mates of these two equations, we estimate the parameters of the equation for the sector choice. Although
this procedure does not yield full information maximum likelihood estimates, Arcidiacono and Jones
(2003) show that this method produces consistent estimates of the parameters. Standard errors estimates
are obtained by a parametric bootstrap procedure, instead of a non parametric one, since this last method
is unstable when applied to the EM algorithm.11
4. Results
4.1. Parameter estimates
Tables 4 to 6 report the parameter estimates of the four equations.
Employment
As expected, the gender negatively affects employment, as well as young children do. Women who
work may choose to get out of the labor market to bring up their children. They then usually wait
for their entrance into nursery or primary school to work again. In France, some children part-time
attend nursery school. The marriage also negatively affects the employment decision. The effect
of age on employment is assumed to be quadratic: we ﬁnd that the employment probability ﬁrst
increases, and then decreases with age.
Moreover, the higher the degree, the higher the probability to be employed. Graduate degrees are
the most rewarding ones in terms of employment probabilities. High-school degree and vocational
degree estimates do not statistically differ.
Individuals who live in the region around Paris or in Paris have a greater probability to be
employed because of job offer opportunities. Finally, as expected, the local unemployment rate
has a negative effect on the probability to be employed.
Sector Choice
Our theoretical model teaches us that, given risk aversion, a higher unemployment rate diminishes
the cost of searching for a public job when unemployed. The relative return associated to the
private sector drops when the unemployment rate rises. This is conﬁrmed by our estimations: the
local unemployment rate favors the choice of public sector (Table 5). Fougère and Pouget (2003)
also ﬁnd that the number of candidates for a public job and the macroeconomic cycle go along.
Hence the local unemployment rate is a core variable to understand public sector attractiveness.
11The parametric bootstrap consists ﬁrst in obtaining reliable parameter estimates for the whole set of unknown parameters
denoted b Â. b Â is obtained by replicating the previously described EM algorithm with different random initial values for the
parameters. The iteration process is necessary to ensure that a global maximum is obtained. Then, given X and b Â, we generate










h=1:::H. For each newly generated data set, we estimate the whole set of




















10Moreover, the greater the difference between expected log wages, the larger the probability to
choose the private sector. Individuals rationally choose the sector where they anticipate the highest
wage.
Unlike the mother’s position, the father’s position has an effect on his children’s sector choice.
A son tends to prefer public services if his father is a civil-servant. The observation that civil
servants’ children are over-represented in the public sector (Audier (2000)) is therefore robust to
the inclusion of covariates such as degree, local unemployment rate. Unlike men, women whose
father is a civil-servant tend to prefer private sector compared to women whose father is not a
civil-servant.
Moreover, as expected, women have a higher propensity than men to work in public services. This
result will be reenforced by wage analysis. This result is in line with Bell, Elliott, and Scott (2005),
who ﬁnd, for UK, that the gains to staying in the public sector are greater for women than for men,
and that women tend to gain by joining the public sector, almost irrespective of their position in
the earnings distribution. We ﬁnd similar results for France (see following sections). Fougère and
Pouget (2003) also ﬁnd that the length of the queue for public sector is longer for female.
Individuals with lower degree tend to work in the private sector unlike individuals with post-
secondary education. Two reasons may explain this effect: ﬁrst, French public jobs are more
qualiﬁed on the whole than jobs in private sector (teaching, executive...). And many public jobs
require to pass an exam which is conditional on a given degree.
Wages
Standardresultsareobtainedfordifferentvariables, suchasage, experience, degree... Forinstance,
living around Paris and in Paris gives a positive premium for wages. The comparison between
private and public wages is more instructive.
Unlike the descriptive statistics, the residual variance is estimated slightly higher in the public
sector (0:109) than in the private one (0:084). For identiﬁcation reasons, we cannot compute what
people usually call "the public raw wage premium". For all degrees, except for graduates, the
returns to education are roughly the same in both sectors. But returns to education for graduates
are greater in the private sector: the highest wages are observed in the private sector.
Worth to be pointed out is the highest penalty to be a women in the private sector. As Gregory and
Borland (1999) underlined, public sector wage inefﬁciency may counterbalance wage discrimina-
tions. That seems to be the case in France as gender is concerned. Nonetheless, to be a woman
has also a negative effect on public wages. Indeed women have lower probabilities to be pro-
moted than men with similar characteristics (Bessière and Pouget (2007)). And in public services,
wage increases are closely linked to grade promotions. Thus career differences may explain wage
differences between men and women in public services.
We give further details on wages in the following section thanks to simulations.
4.2. Types
The results are obtained under the assumption that there are four types of individuals within the sample
(K = 4, see table 7). The number of heterogeneity components is chosen on the basis of the BIC
penalized likelihood criterion: models with K = 3 and K = 2 yield substantially larger BIC values, and
a model with ﬁve types yields a similar BIC criterion than a model with four types.
In a ﬁrst step, we compute the individual posterior probability to be of a given type at the initial






associated to the type k is the highest. The results show that a clear
11Table 4. Employment equation
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Women -0.601 0.049
Not French 0.157 0.044
Not Married 0.049 0.020
Children under 3 -0.241 0.024
Children between 3 and 6 -0.268 0.028
Age (years=10) 4.530 0.204
Age squared (years2=10) -0.564 0.025
Vocational degree 0.234 0.028
High School degree 0.284 0.039
College and Under Graduate 0.378 0.030
Graduate 0.726 0.060
Paris 0.174 0.027
Local unemployment rate -0.010 0.002
Log spouse income 0.026 0.006
Source: French European Household Survey.
The log spouse income is standardized.
Table 5. Private sector choice
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Women -0.236 0.055
Age (years=10) -0.219 0.177
Age squared (years2=10) 0.019 0.021
Not Married 0.046 0.042
Vocational degree 0.084 0.065
High School degree 0.092 0.063
College and Under Graduate -0.114 0.048
Graduate -0.625 0.079
Women times Father civil servant 0.480 0.083
Men times Father civil servant -0.266 0.076
Women times Mother civil servant -0.084 0.068
Men times Mother civil servant 0.043 0.088
Local unemployment rate -0.037 0.005
Difference of expected log wage 1.665 0.195
Source: French European Household Survey.
type-partition exists. At the initial date, type-3 people are mainly nonemployed (84:5%) whereas type-1,
type-2 and type-4 individuals are mainly employed. These latter groups differ according to the sector
choice. 85:5% of type-2 individuals are employed in public services in 1994, whereas 87:9% of type-1
individuals and 75:4% of type-4 individuals are employed in the private sector. Thus employment and
sectors distinctly partition individuals in our sample.
Consideringthevaluesofunobservedheterogeneityfordifferenttypes, remarkthattype-4individuals
have an unobserved ability similar in both sectors (µWPr = 4:631 and µWPu = 4:700), whereas type-1
and type-2 individuals would have a different unobserved ability in both sectors. Type-2 individuals,
mainly employed in the public sector, clearly have chosen the sector in which they are the most paid
12Table 6. Wage equations
Private Sector Public Sector
Variables Estimates Standard Error Estimates Standard Error
Women -0.423 0.016 -0.183 0.008
Paris 0.284 0.010 0.100 0.014
Age (years=10) 0.889 0.063 0.493 0.030
Age squared (years2=10) -0.093 0.008 -0.042 0.003
Age of end of study (years=10) 0.190 0.016 0.041 0.027
Age of end of study squared (years2=10) -0.018 0.005 -0.018 0.008
Vocational degree 0.113 0.008 0.065 0.010
High School degree 0.351 0.013 0.338 0.013
College and undergraduate 0.453 0.012 0.452 0.012
Graduate 0.791 0.012 0.667 0.015
Part-time -0.491 0.007 -0.436 0.012
Year dummies
Year 1995 -0.044 0.015 0.027 0.016
Year 1996 -0.008 0.012 0.024 0.013
Year 1997 0.008 0.013 0.092 0.012
Year 1998 0.019 0.014 0.030 0.014
Year 1999 0.063 0.013 0.068 0.016
Year 2000 0.020 0.012 0.088 0.014
Year 2001 -0.010 0.014 0.047 0.016
Variance of residuals 0.083 0.014 0.109 0.004
Source: French European Household Survey.
(µWPr = 4:838 and µWPu = 5:774). They may have sorted themselves into the sector that pays them
more. For the type-1 individuals, this explanation does not hold. They would have a higher productivity
in the public sector.
5. Simulations
5.1. Model ﬁt
This section presents a brief ﬁt analysis of the statistical model presented above. Table 8 presents the
predicted probabilities for nonemployment, public jobs and private jobs.12 The frequencies of nonem-
ployment such as those of employment in either sector are well replicated whatever the date considered.
Further the model replicates well the cross sectional distribution. Figure 2 plots the observed and
predicted log of monthly wage densities for the two sectors separately, which are quite close.
5.2. Counterfactual wage distributions
In this section, we derive the counterfactual wage distribution for the individuals employed in the public
sector: we aim at estimating the log of monthly wages of the public workers if they were employed in
the private sector. This is a crucial issue to understand whether the public sector wages are economically
justiﬁed, or whether they help to circumvent some discrimination issues, for women for instance.
To estimate these counterfactual distributions at date t, we use bootstrapping methods. We draw H
independent individual replicates, drawn from the empirical distribution of the explanatory variables of
12We evaluate the predicted probability to be employed at date t thanks to: E(yt) = E(E(ytjT)) =
PK
k=1 ¼kE(ytjT = k).
13Table 7. Unobserved heterogeneity
Variables Estimates Standard Error
Probability of different types
Type 1 0.193 0.170
Type 2 0.223 0.216
Type 3 0.233 0.233






















Source: French European Household Survey.
the public sector workers at date t (yit = 1 and zit = 0). For each individual replicate h, we draw his
type t(h) in the following posterior distribution
P(Th = kjyht = 1;zht = 0;Xht) =
¼kP(yht = 1;zht = 0jTh = k;Xht)
PK
l=1 ¼lP(yht = 1;zht = 0jTh = l;Xht)
; (5.10)
where Th is the random variable representing the type of the individual h. Then we compute the corre-









d ¯Pu + d µPu
t(h): (5.12)
Finally we add a sector-speciﬁc residual term that is i.i.d normally distributed with the estimated sector-
speciﬁc variance. The results rely on the hypothesis that the 4 types are homogeneous as regards the
public and private sector capabilities.
Anyway on the ﬁgure 3, we observe that the counterfactual distribution remains close to the log of
wage public distribution. But this hides different effects according to gender and degrees (see ﬁgure
14Table 8. Model Fit
Variables Year Predicted probability Observed probability
% %
























Source: French European Household Survey.
4). The counterfactual distribution for men is rather stable except for the upper tail, whereas the female
counterfactual distribution shifts left.
In order to precisely evaluate the public wage premium, let us derive and compare quantiles of the
former distributions: the public log of wage distribution and the counterfactual distribution. Further
details are given in appendix E. Figures 5 and 6 plot the difference of quantiles between the current
and the counterfactual distributions according to gender and degrees. The term "public wage premium"
seems to be justiﬁed at the bottom of the distribution, whereas it does not hold anymore for the upper
tail. But when detailed by degree and gender, we ﬁnd that the public sector, when compared with the
private sector, actually gives a premium to women, whereas men would be better paid in the private
sector except for those at the lower tail of the distribution. As expected given previous estimations, male
graduates would be far better paid in the private sector. So we ﬁnd similar results to Disney and Gosling
(1998) and Bell, Elliott, and Scott (2005): public sector premium is higher for women than for men, and
this premium differs across the pay distribution. The lower part of the distribution gains from staying in
the public sector. Does it mean that female public workers are overpaid? It may only suggest that the
public sector succeeds in reducing the wage gap between male and female, which is large in the private
sector. Finally most male public workers would have the same or a higher wage if they were employed
in the private sector...13
13It is essential to control for selection into employment and for selection into sector choice to assess the public wage
premium. Naive estimations of this public wage premium given in section 2 cannot be appropriate since they only rely on the
156. Conclusion
This paper presents a new approach on the public-private pay gap: it evaluates the counterfactual wage
distribution of public workers if employed in the private sector.
It estimates sector-speciﬁc wage equations controlling both for sector choice and employment selec-
tion. Thanks to panel data, it captures unobserved heterogeneity which differs between equations. The
unobserved heterogeneity is modeled using the method of Heckman and Singer (1984) via a discrete
distribution.
The main results are that the wage public premium is signiﬁcant at the bottom of the public wage
distribution. But it turns out to be negative at the upper tail. This is in line with empirical observations:
low-wage civil-servants are weakly mobile, whereas high-wage civil servants move more frequently
from the public to the private sector, attracted by higher wages. However these results are mitigated
when analyzed by gender. The female public sector workers have a comparative advantage in the public
sector. Their counterfactual wages in the private sector would be lower whatever their position in the
public wage distribution. Whereas graduated men in the public sector would have higher wages in the
private sector, graduated women would have the same one. Could we conclude that the public sector
overpays women? It may rather counterbalance wage discrimination (see Gregory and Borland (1999)).
Finally, for men employed in the public sector, except at the very bottom of the distribution, they would
have the same or higher wages in the private sector.
value of the constant covariate.
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A. The Search Model
We derive a continuous time search model in a stationary labor market environment. There are three
possible states: employment in the public sector, employment in the private sector and nonemployment.
The individuals employed in the private sector can be laid off, and they may search for a private job on
the job. Those employed in the public sector do not search for a job and cannot be laid off. In France,
a public servant can indeed not be laid off. A public employee can be ﬁred only in very rare cases, the
rules of which greatly differ from private-sector ones (disciplinary sanctions in the public sector). Hence
ﬁrings in the public sector are neglected. Finally the nonemployed may search either for a public or for
a private job.
Agents live inﬁnitely. At each point in time, they can be either nonemployed (denoted by n as
non employed that is unemployed or out of the labor force), or employed either in the private sector
(denoted by Pr) or in the public sector (denoted by Pu). Unemployment and nonparticipation are
assumed to be non distinct labor force states. This assumption is not restrictive since we focus on the
choice between the public and the private sector, and the data set is restricted to people under 60 who
have a high participation rate, whether male or female. Nonemployed individuals enjoy a real return
b and receive job offers at a Poisson rate depending on the sector of research ¸n;Pr and ¸n;Pu. b may
represent non labor incomes. Nonemployed individuals support research costs depending on the type of
job they search for: cPr (resp. cPu) for private jobs (resp. for public jobs). They can decide to restrict
their research to private jobs. Agents who decide to search for a job in the public sector can fail to enter
public services although they get a public offer since they have to succeed the entrance exam to become
a civil servant. pS denotes the probability to succeed conditional on searching for a job in this sector,
and it implicitly depends on individual covariates.
When employed in the private sector, individuals receive a real wage w, and they continue to receive
private job offers at a Poisson rate ¸Pr;Pr. They are assumed to restrict their job research to the private
sector and they face search costs c.14 Existing private jobs are hit by idiosyncratic (productive) shocks
that occur at a Poisson rate ±. This assumption implies that an individual cannot transit directly from
the private to the public sector, he has to go through an unemployment period. To ease calculations, the
instantaneous discount rate is ½ and the horizon is inﬁnite.
Finally, when employed in the public sector, agents cannot search for a private job. We detail later
what are the consequences of this assumption.
FPr denotes the wage distribution in the private sector on [0;w], FPu in the public sector on [0;w].
We assume that these distributions are different from one another but that they rely on the same ﬁnite
support for sake of simplicity. Nevertheless the tails of the distributions can be far different (see the
empirical part for some illustration, ﬁgure 1).
In the sequel V denotes the value function.
¡ A worker currently employed in the public sector with starting wage w receives net income w and
cannot loose his job. We assume that he receives no external nor internal offer. His value function














¡ A worker currently employed in the private sector receives a net income w ¡ c and may be forcibly
separated from his job with probability ±. He also receives private job offers at rate ¸Pr;Pr which

















which can be simpliﬁed in





¡ A currently nonemployed person enjoys a net ﬂow of income b¡c¡dPucPu depending on her choice

















(1 ¡ ¸n;Pr¢t ¡ ¸n;PudPu¢t)Vn: (A.16)
For the nonemployed, the optimal acceptance rule consists in accepting the ﬁrst job, whatever the
sector, that pays more than a reservation wage w¤ that is speciﬁc to the sector: w¤
Pu for the public sector
and w
¤;dPu
Pr for the private sector (w
¤;dPu=1
Pr denotes the reservation wage when the unemployed search
for both public and private jobs, w
¤;dPu=0
Pr when the unemployed search only for private jobs).
dPu 2 f0;1g VPr(w
¤;dPu
Pr ) = V dPu
n
VPu(w¤
Pu) = V dPu=1
n :
These reservation wages exist and are unique because the private and public value functions are
continuous and increasing functions. Therefore the equation (A.16) can be rewritten:15
½V dPu




(VPr(x) ¡ Vn)dFPr(x) (A.17)






When does a nonemployed worker decide to search for a public job? Searching for a public job is
actually costly and risky since individuals are not sure to succeed to enter public services. This cost of
searching for a public job is induced by the fact that individuals have to pick up information, to prepare
entrance exams. Hence nonemployed will search for a public job when their expected gains, which may
depend on individual characteristics and unobserved ability, exceed the searching cost (see ﬁgure 7). So
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The probability to search for a public job is P(cPu · Upu). When the cost of searching for a public
job is greater than Upu, the nonemployed had rather searched for a private job only. Upu depends on
individual characteristics, on the probability of passing the exam and ﬁnally, on the reservation wage via
h(w¤
d=0).
Equation (A.18) entails that the value of the threshold, determining the search for a public job, is
lower when the probability to succeed the entrance exams decreases or when the public arrival rate is
lower. Upu depends on ¸n;Pu and pS in a multiplicative way, since h(w¤
d=0) does not depend on these
variables.
Which consequences? First, the higher the probability to pass the exam (pS), the higher the probability
to search for a public job. This feature is empirically illustrated by the fact that the individuals with
a higher degree have a higher probability to pass the entrance exams. For instance, in 2006, among
individuals who take the "CAPES" exam (entrance exam to become a high-school or secondary-
school teacher), 53% had a "licence" degree (L3) and 44% had a "maîtrise" (M1), this latter degree
requires an additional year of studies. Considering those who ﬁnally pass the exam, 58% had a
maîtrise and only 41% had a licence. Similar features hold for other public-sector exams. The
higher the degree, the higher the probability to pass the exam.
Second the unemployment rate is captured by the parameter ±, and h(w¤
d=0) depends on ± only
by the way of w¤
d=0. It turns that w¤
d=0 diminishes when ± grows (see Appendix B and equation
A.19). Hence the probability to search for a public job increases with ±.
The limits of the model
This model presents several limits: unemployed and nonparticipants are not distinguished. As the
sample is composed of people aged between 16 and 59, largely economically active, this assump-
tion is not very restrictive. Furthermore, the model assumes that public workers cannot search for
a private job. This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity but if relaxed, our core results
would not be modiﬁed. The function value associated to the public sector would be larger, since
it is more ﬂexible: the French civil servants could work a few years in the private sector and get
16Details are in appendix B
19their public job back in the public sector. Henceforth they could not suffer from their private-job
experience: even if laid off, they could recover a job in public services. In such a case, their wage
would be the wage they had when departing for a private experience.
Finally the model does not take into account possible parental or sabbatic leaves for civil servants.
Moreover we do not enable direct transitions from the public to the private sector, and vice versa.
These limits would modify both the public and the private function values but the core results
would not change.
B. Structural model
From (A.15), differentiating this latter equation with respect to w yields:
½V
0









½ + ± + ¸Pr;PrFPr(y)
dy
Let us consider both cases.
² Case 1: dPu = 0
When the individual does not search for a public job, if he receives an offer with a wage w
greater than w¤
d=0, he accepts this offer. The reservation wage w¤







































Pr;d=0 = b (B.20)





½ + ± + ¸Pr;PrFPr(x)
dx
² Case 2: dPu = 1
Let us proceed the same way thus we get:
½V d=1






































½ + ± + ¸Pr;PrFPr(x)
(x)dx
w¤














The values we have to compare to determine whether the individual searches for a public job, are
V d=0
n and V d=1
















































½ + ± + ¸Pr;PrFPr(x)
dx










½ + ± + ¸Pr;PrFPr(x)
dx





½ + ± + ¸Pr;PrFPr(x)
Hence g is a decreasing and bounded function and three different cases are possible. Indeed, 8x 2 [0;w],
0 ¸ f0(x) ¸ f0(x) + g0(x).




² f(0) + g(0) ¸ f(0) and f(w) + g(w) ¸ f(w): it means that a nonemployed person always
searches for both public and private jobs.
² f(0) + g(0) ¸ f(0) and f(w) + g(w) < f(w): it means that a nonemployed person may search
for a public job depending on g(w¤
d=0). If g(w¤
d=0) ¸ 0 the nonemployed person will search for a


























} On the other hand
g(w¤






















Proposition B.1 Search for a public job














¡ cPu the cost to search for a public job
¡ ¸n;Pu the public job offer arrival rate
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yit = 1;zit = 1;wPr
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We hence get four sequential optimization problems:






























where © denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standardized gaussian.
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D.2. Monte Carlo Simulation
In order to be sure no mistake were left in the Gauss Code, we run a monte carlo simulation. We simulate 100



























































denotes the vector of the unobserved heterogeneity components. We use 4 types of
unobserved heterogeneity.




denotes the vector of the observable characteristics. Each equation has 3 observed













denotes the vector of residuals, which are assumed to be independent and normally
distributed across time and individuals, with variance ¾2
Pr (resp. ¾2
Pu).
Table D.2 reports the original values and the estimates of the parameters. The results conﬁrm the absence of
fatal error in the code.



































































25E. Quantile differences between the public log of wage distributions and
the counterfactual distribution
Table 9. Quantile differences between the public log of wage and the counterfactual distributions.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Quantiles Estimates
Standard Errors
0.050 0.157 0.170 0.158 0.154 0.155 0.157 0.157 0.168
0.035 0.031 0.036 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036
0.100 0.148 0.161 0.159 0.154 0.157 0.155 0.153 0.158
0.030 0.029 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.031
0.150 0.135 0.147 0.147 0.144 0.148 0.146 0.143 0.145
0.028 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.028
0.200 0.123 0.133 0.135 0.131 0.137 0.135 0.133 0.134
0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026
0.250 0.113 0.121 0.124 0.120 0.126 0.126 0.124 0.123
0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025
0.300 0.105 0.111 0.113 0.111 0.116 0.116 0.114 0.114
0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.024
0.350 0.096 0.102 0.104 0.102 0.107 0.106 0.107 0.105
0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.400 0.089 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.099 0.098 0.098 0.097
0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022
0.450 0.082 0.085 0.087 0.087 0.090 0.089 0.090 0.089
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
0.500 0.075 0.078 0.080 0.080 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
0.550 0.069 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.075
0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021
0.600 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.068
0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021
0.650 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.060
0.024 0.022 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022
0.700 0.048 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.052
0.024 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022
0.750 0.040 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.042 0.039 0.042
0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022
0.800 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.031
0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.850 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.017
0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.024
0.900 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.003
0.024 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.024 0.024
0.950 -0.037 -0.040 -0.039 -0.035 -0.033 -0.030 -0.032 -0.032
0.023 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.025
Source: French European Household Survey.
26F. Figures
Figure 1 Density of the log of wages in 1994.





















Figure 2 Predicted log of monthly wages - 1994














































27Figure 3 Counterfactual log of monthly wages for civil servants - 1994










































  Men− predicted public wage
Men− counterfactual private wage




















Women− predicted public wage
Women− counterfactual private wage
28Figure 4 Counterfactual log of monthly wages according to degrees
































































































29Figure 5 Quantile differences between counterfactual and public log of wage distribution from 1994 to
2001.
































































































































































Quantile Difference between men and women whatever the degree
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Quantile Difference for men according to degrees


































Quantile Difference for women according to degrees




30Figure 7 Value function comparison
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